

Generator Contingency Modeling in Electric Energy Markets

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Outline

- Key Takeaway Points
- Existing Industry Practices
- Review: Standard DCOPF Problem
- Generator Contingency Modeling Enhancements: Derivation of Prices via Duality Theory
- Conclusions and Future Research Topics

Key Takeaway Points

- **Challenges faced by traditional market auction models:**
 - Dramatic changes in the resource mix due to the **increased reliance on renewable energy resources**
 - **Inadequately handle generator contingencies** and other typical forms of uncertainties (load, renewable)
- **Ideal solution:** Model the uncertainty explicitly
 - Stochastic programming approaches (scalability, market barriers)
- **Practical outlook:** Modern-day market modifications
 - Market advancements: New products (flexible ramping product), market reformulations (contingency modeling enhancements)
 - Such adjustments have associated market implications
- **This research proposes new approaches for these market advancements to improve efficiency, enhance price signals, maintain scalability, and transparency**

Research Projects and Funding

- Project: **Dynamic Reserve Policies for Market Management Systems**
 - Funding: The Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions (**CERTS**) with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
- Project: **Network Optimized Distributed Energy Systems (NODES)**
 - Funding: The Advanced Research Projects Agency – Energy (**ARPA-E**) with the U.S. DOE

Existing Industry Practices

Transmission Contingency Modeling

- Long standing (traditional) practice:
 - **Models uncertainty:** Explicit representation of transmission contingencies (stochastic program)
 - **Security constraints to ensure second-stage feasibility:**


$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Post-contingency} \\ \text{flow on} \\ \text{transmission line } \ell \end{array} = \begin{array}{l} \text{Pre-contingency} \\ \text{flow on} \\ \text{transmission line } \ell \end{array} + \begin{array}{l} \text{Redistributed flow} \\ \text{from contingency line } c \\ \text{to transmission line } \ell \\ \text{via LODFs} \end{array}$$

- Generator post-contingency set point **equals** its pre-contingency set point (**no second-stage recourse decision variables**)
- **Pricing implications:**
 - **LMP congestion component** is based on pre-contingency congestion and post-transmission contingency congestion
 - **Pricing is straightforward:** no re-dispatch; transmission not a market participant

Generator Contingency Modeling

- Contemporary market structures:
 - **Myopic reserve policies:** System-wide requirements; **procure reserve that may not be deliverable** post-contingency
 - **Reserve zones:** Regional requirements; **static** despite changing system conditions; **ignore local congestion** within zones
 - **Dynamic zones:** **Opposition from stakeholders**; affects their profit and bidding strategy (due to zone reconfiguration)
 - **Reserve sharing:** Available transfer capability on interfaces; artificially de-rating; nomograms; **unanticipated congestion**
- Day-ahead market model is imprecise
- Part of the decision making gets pushed to the **adjustment period** to attain **feasibility** and **security**
 - Operator-initiated discretionary out-of-market corrections (**OMCs**)
 - **Terms:** exceptional dispatch; out-of-sequence dispatch; reserve disqualification; reserve down-flags; uneconomic adjustment

Generator Contingency Modeling



- **Industry push:** Zonal to nodal *analogous* to energy product
- **Goal:**
 - Procure **deliverable reserve**
 - Account for the **value of reserve** provided by each generator
 - Enable scheduling models to **optimally handle more products** (reserve) instead of relying on manual OMCs
- **Approach:** Explicit representation of generator contingencies
- **Anticipated impacts:** Price signals to better reflect actual operational requirements; quality of service provided by generators

MISO: Zonal Deliverability Constraints

- MISO utilizes post-generator contingency security constraints to determine their zonal reserve requirements [1]


$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} \text{Post-} & & \text{Pre-} & & \text{Effect of} & & \text{Effect of} \\ \text{contingency} & = & \text{contingency} & - & \text{supply loss} & + & \text{zonal} \\ \text{flow} & & \text{flow} & & \text{on flow} & & \text{reserve} \\ & & & & & & \text{deployment} \\ & & & & & & \text{on flow} \end{array}$$

- Zonal model: Employs **zonal PTDFs**; ignores network within the zone
- Employs a simplistic approach to pre-determine **zonal reserve deployment factors**
- Models **only** largest generator outage per zone
- Examines impacts on **few** critical interfaces; improves transfer of reserve between (and not within) zones

[1] Y. Chen, P. Gribik, and J. Gardner, "Incorporating post zonal reserve deployment transmission constraints into energy and ancillary service co-optimization," *IEEE Trans. Power Syst.*, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 537-549, Mar. 2014.

MISO: Zonal Deliverability Constraints

- MISO's recent proposal: Split zone 1 between north and south (September, 2017) [2]



[2] MISO Market Subcommittee, "Proposed changes to reserve zone calculations - Responding to 4/1 spin shortage event," Aug. 2017.

CAISO: Generator Contingency and Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) Modeling

- CAISO intends to enhance its market models to include [3]:
 - Generator contingencies and pre-defined RAS explicitly
 - Combined transmission and generator contingencies explicitly

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} \text{Post-} & & \text{Pre-} & & \text{Effect of} & & \text{Effect of} \\ \text{contingency} & = & \text{contingency} & - & \text{supply loss} & + & \text{reserve} \\ \text{flow} & & \text{flow} & & \text{on flow} & & \text{response on} \\ & & & & & & \text{flow via GDFs} \end{array}$$

- Post-contingency security constraints for each modeled generator contingency case [3]
 - Explicit representation of generator contingencies
 - No second-stage recourse decisions (well... sort of)
 - Need: Contribute to the theoretical domain to pave the way for market reform associated to uncertainty modeling and modeling of corrective actions

[3] CAISO, "Draft final proposal: Generator contingency and remedial action scheme modeling," [Online]. Available: https://www.caiso.com/Documents/DraftFinalProposal-GeneratorContingencyandRemedialActionSchemeModeling_updatedjul252017.pdf, July 25, 2017.

Review of the DCOPF Problem

DCOPF Problem

- There are many different ways to formulate the DCOPF problem
- **Focus:** PTDF-based formulation of the DCOPF problem
- **Note:** Economic interpretations of its dual apply to this DCOPF formulation
- **If the DCOPF is formulated differently, the dual will not be the same and may result in different interpretations of that different dual, e.g., the $B-\theta$ formulation**

DCOPF Problem: Primal Problem

- Primal problem:

$$\text{Minimize: } \underbrace{\sum_n c_n P_n}_{\text{Generation cost}} \quad (1)$$

Subject to: **Generation cost**

$$-P_n \geq -P_n^{max}, \forall n \in N \quad (\alpha_n) \quad (2)$$

$$\sum_n PTDF_{k,n}^R (P_n - D_n) \geq -P_k^{max,a}, \forall k \in K \quad (F_k^-) \quad (3)$$

$$-\sum_n PTDF_{k,n}^R (P_n - D_n) \geq -P_k^{max,a}, \forall k \in K \quad (F_k^+) \quad (4)$$

$$\sum_n P_n - D_n = 0, \quad (\delta) \quad (5)$$

$$D_n = \overline{D_n}, \forall n \in N \quad (\lambda_n) \quad (6)$$

$$P_n \geq 0.$$

DCOPF Problem: Dual Problem Formulation

- **Objective** of the dual problem:

$$\text{Maximize}_{\alpha_n, F_k^-, F_k^+, \delta, \lambda_n} : \underbrace{-\sum_n P_n^{max} \alpha_n}_{\text{Generation rent}} - \underbrace{\sum_k P_k^{max,a} (F_k^- + F_k^+)}_{\text{Congestion rent}} + \underbrace{\sum_n \bar{D}_n \lambda_n}_{\text{Load payment}} \quad (7)$$

- **Strong duality (SD)**: conveys exchange of money, payments, and expenses resulting from an auction
 - Dual objective is equal to primal objective, at optimality (by SD)
 - Load payment is equal to generation revenue plus congestion rent
- **Dual constraints corresponding to the generator production and the demand variables in primal**

$$-\alpha_n + \sum_k PTDF_{k,n}^R (F_k^- - F_k^+) + \delta \leq c_n, \forall n \in N \quad (\mathbf{P}_n) \quad (8)$$

$$\sum_k PTDF_{k,n}^R (F_k^+ - F_k^-) - \delta + \lambda_n = 0, \forall n \in N \quad (\mathbf{D}_n) \quad (9)$$

DCOPF Problem: Dual Problem Formulation

▪ Locational marginal price (LMP):

$$\lambda_n = \delta + \sum_k PTD F_{k,n}^R (F_k^- - F_k^+), \forall n \in N \quad (D_n) \quad (9a)$$


Marginal energy component Marginal congestion component

- Dual variable that signifies the increase (or decrease) to the primal objective if there is slightly more (or less) consumption by the load
- **No loss component:** DC, lossless model
- **No post-transmission contingency congestion component**

▪ Dual constraint corresponding to generator production reduces to

$$-\alpha_n + \lambda_n \leq c_n, \forall n \in N \quad (P_n) \quad (8a)$$

- Dual variable, α , signifies the **short-term marginal benefit of increasing a generator's maximum capacity**

DCOPF Problem: Dual Problem Formulation

$$-\alpha_n + \lambda_n \leq c_n, \forall n \in N \quad (P_n) \quad (8a)$$

▪ **Complementary slackness (CS)** tells us, **at optimality**:

$$(-\alpha_n + \lambda_n)P_n = c_n P_n, \forall n \in N$$

$$-P_n \alpha_n = -P_n^{max} \alpha_n, \forall n \in N$$

$$P_n^{max} \alpha_n = \lambda_n P_n - c_n P_n$$


Generator rent Generator revenue Generator cost

Complete Dual Formulation

- Dual problem:

$$\text{Maximize}_{\alpha_n, F_k^-, F_k^+, \delta, \lambda_n} : - \sum_n P_n^{max} \alpha_n - \sum_k P_k^{max,a} (F_k^- + F_k^+) + \sum_n \bar{D}_n \lambda_n \quad (7)$$

Subject to:

$$-\alpha_n + \sum_k PTDF_{k,n}^R (F_k^- - F_k^+) + \delta \leq c_n, \forall n \in N \quad (\mathbf{P}_n) \quad (8)$$

$$\sum_k PTDF_{k,n}^R (F_k^+ - F_k^-) - \delta + \lambda_n = 0, \forall n \in N \quad (\mathbf{D}_n) \quad (9)$$

$$\alpha_n \geq 0, F_k^- \geq 0, F_k^+ \geq 0, \delta \text{ free}, \lambda_n \text{ free} .$$

Generator Contingency Modeling: Derivation of Prices via Duality Theory

Enhanced DCOPF Problem: Primal Problem

- Primal reformulation [3]: **Focuses on key proposed change**

$$\text{Minimize: } \sum_n c_n P_n \quad (10)$$

P_n, D_n

Subject to:

$$-P_n \geq -P_n^{max}, \forall n \in N \quad (\alpha_n) \quad (11)$$

$$\sum_n PTDF_{k,n}^R (P_n - D_n) \geq -P_k^{max,a}, \forall k \in K \quad (F_k^-) \quad (12)$$

$$-\sum_n PTDF_{k,n}^R (P_n - D_n) \geq -P_k^{max,a}, \forall k \in K \quad (F_k^+) \quad (13)$$

$$\sum_n PTDF_{k,n}^R (P_n + GDF_{n'(c),n} P_{n'(c)} - D_n) \geq -P_k^{max,c}, \forall k \in K^{crt}, c \in C^{g^{crt}} \quad (F_k^{c-}) \quad (14)$$

$$-\sum_n PTDF_{k,n}^R (P_n + GDF_{n'(c),n} P_{n'(c)} - D_n) \geq -P_k^{max,c}, \forall k \in K^{crt}, c \in C^{g^{crt}} \quad (F_k^{c+}) \quad (15)$$

$$\sum_n P_n - D_n = 0, \quad (\delta) \quad (16)$$

$$D_n = \bar{D}_n, \forall n \in N \quad (\lambda_n) \quad (17)$$

$$P_n \geq 0.$$

- The enhanced DCOPF problem **does not** include: Transmission contingency modeling, reserve requirements, inter-temporal restrictions, ramping restrictions...

[3] CAISO, "Draft final proposal: Generator contingency and remedial action scheme modeling," [Online]. Available:

Generation Loss Distribution Factors (GDFs)

- **Generator loss:** Distributed across the system via **GDFs** [3]

$$GDF_{n'(c),n} = \begin{cases} -1, n = n'(c) \\ 0, n \neq n'(c) \wedge n \notin S^{FR} \\ \frac{u_n P_n^{max}}{\sum_{\substack{n \in S^{FR} \\ n \neq n'(c)}} u_n P_n^{max}}, n \neq n'(c) \wedge n \in S^{FR}, \forall n \in N, c \in C^{g^{crt}}. \end{cases}$$

- **Prorated** based on maximum online (*frequency responsive*) capacity
- **Aim:** Estimate the effect of generator loss and system response

[3] CAISO, "Draft final proposal: Generator contingency and remedial action scheme modeling," [Online]. Available: https://www.caiso.com/Documents/DraftFinalProposal-GeneratorContingencyandRemedialActionSchemeModeling_updatedjul252017.pdf, July 25, 2017.

Generation Loss Distribution Factors (GDFs)

- **Ignores:** Dispatch set point; capacity, reserve, and ramp restrictions; multiple units at a node

$$\sum_n PTDF_{k,n}^R (P_n + GDF_{n'(c),n} P_{n'(c)} - D_n) \geq -P_k^{max,c}, \forall k \in K^{crt}, c \in C^{g^{crt}}$$

- **Note:** GDF shows up only in security constraints and is multiplied by the **MW dispatch variable for the simulated contingency generator**
 - This variable (and the GDF, fixed input) **drives the only functional relationship** between the change in a **line's flow** between the pre- and post-contingency states
 - GDFs **mask the response** provided by frequency responsive units to a drop in supply; has **implications on generator rent**

[3] CAISO, "Draft final proposal: Generator contingency and remedial action scheme modeling," [Online]. Available: https://www.caiso.com/Documents/DraftFinalProposal-GeneratorContingencyandRemedialActionSchemeModeling_updatedjul252017.pdf, July 25, 2017.

Enhanced Primal: Dual Formulation

- Dual problem:

$$\underset{\alpha_n, F_k^-, F_k^+, F_k^{c-}, F_k^{c+}, \delta, \lambda_n}{\text{Maximize}} : -\sum_n (P_n^{\max} \alpha_n) - \sum_k \left(P_k^{\max, a} (F_k^- + F_k^+) \right) - \sum_{\substack{k \in K^{\text{crt}}, \\ c \in C^{\text{g}^{\text{crt}}}} \left(P_k^{\max, c} (F_k^{c-} + F_k^{c+}) \right) + \sum_n (\bar{D}_n \lambda_n) \quad (18)$$

Subject to:

$$-\alpha_n + \sum_k PTDF_{k,n}^R (F_k^- - F_k^+) + \left(\sum_{\substack{k \in K^{\text{crt}}, \\ c \in C^{\text{g}^{\text{crt}}}} (F_k^{c-} - F_k^{c+}) (PTDF_{k,n}^R + \bar{Y}_{n'(c),n} \sum_{s \in N} PTDF_{k,s}^R GDF_{n'(c),s}) \right) + \delta \leq c_n, \forall n \in N \quad (\mathbf{P}_n) \quad (19)$$

$$\sum_k PTDF_{k,n}^R (F_k^+ - F_k^-) + \sum_{\substack{k \in K^{\text{crt}}, \\ c \in C^{\text{g}^{\text{crt}}}} PTDF_{k,n}^R (F_k^{c+} - F_k^{c-}) - \delta + \lambda_n = 0, \forall n \in N \quad (\mathbf{D}_n) \quad (20)$$

$\alpha_n \geq 0, F_k^- \geq 0, F_k^+ \geq 0, F_k^{c-} \geq 0, F_k^{c+} \geq 0, \delta$ free, λ_n free.

where, $\bar{Y}_{n'(c),n} = \begin{cases} 0, & n \neq n'(c) \\ 1, & n = n'(c) \end{cases}, \forall n \in N, c \in C^{\text{g}^{\text{crt}}}.$

Objective of the Dual Problem

- **Objective** of the dual problem:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \underset{\alpha_n, F_k^-, F_k^+, F_k^{c-}, F_k^{c+}, \delta, \lambda_n}{\text{Maximize}} : - \underbrace{\sum_n (P_n^{max} \alpha_n)}_{\text{Generation rent}} + \underbrace{\sum_n (\bar{D}_n \lambda_n)}_{\text{Load payment}} \\
 & - \underbrace{\sum_k \left(P_k^{max,a} (F_k^- + F_k^+) \right) - \sum_{c \in C^{g^{crt}}} \left(P_k^{max,c} (F_k^{c-} + F_k^{c+}) \right)}_{\text{Congestion rent}} \tag{18}
 \end{aligned}$$

- The dual objective must equal the primal objective at optimality (by SD)
 - Load payment is equal to generation revenue plus congestion rent
 - **Strong duality communicates the exchange of money, payments and expenses resulting from the auction**

Enhanced DCOPF: New LMP Definition

- **Dual constraint corresponding to the demand variable in the primal reformulation**

$$\sum_k PTDF_{k,n}^R (F_k^+ - F_k^-) + \sum_{\substack{k \in K^{crt} \\ c \in Cg^{crt}}} PTDF_{k,n}^R (F_k^{c+} - F_k^{c-}) - \delta + \lambda_n = 0, \forall n \in N \quad (D_n) \quad (20)$$

- **Primary impact on pricing: Affects the LMP**

$$\lambda_n = \underbrace{\delta}_{\text{Marginal energy component}} + \underbrace{\sum_k PTDF_{k,n}^R (F_k^- - F_k^+)}_{\text{Marginal pre-contingency congestion component}} + \underbrace{\sum_{\substack{k \in K^{crt} \\ c \in Cg^{crt}}} PTDF_{k,n}^R (F_k^{c-} - F_k^{c+})}_{\text{Marginal post-contingency congestion component}}, \quad \forall n \in N \quad (D_n) \quad (20a)$$

- Additional congestion component comes from the modeling of critical generator contingencies
- Transmission contingencies? Losses?

CAISO's Proposed LMP Definition

- CAISO's proposed LMP definition [3]

$$\lambda_n = \delta + \sum_k PTD F_{k,n}^R (F_k^- - F_k^+) + \sum_{\substack{k \in K^{crt} \\ c \in C^{g^{crt}}}} [(F_k^{c-} - F_k^{c+}) (PTD F_{k,n}^R + \bar{Y}_{n'(c),n} \sum_{s \in N} PTD F_{k,s}^R GDF_{n'(c),s})],$$

(D_n) (20b)

- Compared to

$$\lambda_n = \delta + \underbrace{\sum_k PTD F_{k,n}^R (F_k^- - F_k^+)}_{\text{Marginal pre-contingency congestion component}} + \underbrace{\sum_{c \in C^{g^{crt}}} PTD F_{k,n}^R (F_k^{c-} - F_k^{c+})}_{\text{Marginal post-contingency congestion component}},$$

(D_n) (20a)

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Short-Term Generator Profit (Rent)

- **System-wide generation rent:**
 - Broken down for generators that are (*and are not*) contained in the critical generator contingency list
- **Aim:** To analyze impact of the proposed changes on **prices and revenues for generators** that are (and are not) contained in the critical generator contingency list

Short-Term Generator Profit (Rent)

$$\sum_n PTDF_{k,n}^R (P_n + GDF_{n'(c),n} P_{n'(c)} - D_n) \geq -P_k^{max,c}, \forall k \in K^{crt}, c \in C^{g^{crt}}$$

- **Note:** GDF shows up only in security constraints and is multiplied by the **MW dispatch variable for the simulated contingency generator**
 - **Post-contingency congestion** (and the new LMP component): *driven by cost of the contingency generator* and not the cost associated to responding units
 - **Power systems outlook:** **What is critical to ensure security?** Model the change in injection at the nodes of responding units? Or their cost?
 - **Economic outlook:**
 - Cost **not** related to units that respond (e.g., fast-starts)
 - Result: Pricing that pairs with **incorrect economic incentives**
 - Model **does not acknowledge** any costs due to re-dispatch of units post-contingency (or costs due to reserve activation)
 - Cost changes **only** by forcing a different pre-contingency dispatch set point that is secure

Generator Rent: Non-Critical Generators

- Generator rent earned by **non-critical** generators: Generator revenue less generator cost

$$P_n^{max} \alpha_n = \lambda_n P_n - c_n P_n \quad (21)$$


Generator rent Generator revenue Generator cost

- Identical to standard DCOPF problem (but LMP has an added term)

Generator Rent: Critical Generators

- Generator rent earned by **critical** generators:

$$P_n^{max} \alpha_n = \underbrace{\lambda_n P_n}_{\text{Generator rent}} + \underbrace{\sum_{\substack{k \in K^{crt} \\ c \in Cg^{crt}}} [(F_k^{c-} - F_k^{c+}) (\sum_{s \in N} PTDF_{k,s}^R GDF_{n'(c),s} P_s)]}_{\text{Generator revenue}} - \underbrace{c_n P_n}_{\text{Generator cost}} \quad (22)$$

- CAISO's proposed LMP definition [3]**

$$\lambda_n = \delta + \sum_k PTDF_{k,n}^R (F_k^- - F_k^+) + \sum_{\substack{k \in K^{crt} \\ c \in Cg^{crt}}} PTDF_{k,n}^R (F_k^{c-} - F_k^{c+}) + \sum_{\substack{k \in K^{crt} \\ c \in Cg^{crt}}} [(F_k^{c-} - F_k^{c+}) (\sum_{s \in N} PTDF_{k,s}^R GDF_{n'(c),s})],$$

$\forall n \in N$ (D_n) (20b)

Generator Rent: Critical Generators

- Generator profit **not** as defined:
 - ISO will have revenue shortfall overall or surplus: Not **revenue neutral**
- Confirms the payment for generators in the critical list
- Interpretation:
 - Combination of the extra term and the post-contingency congestion component of the LMP: **Congestion transfer cost**
 - Critical generator pays a **congestion charge** for the difference between injecting at its location and instead injecting at the locations identified by the GDFs
 - **Model still acknowledges that the generator is producing; it is just producing now magically at different locations**
 - **Right way:** Critical generator should **buy** from the locations identified by the GDF or have some sort of a **side contract** with the generators at those locations

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Conclusions and Future Research Topics

Conclusions: GDF Pricing Impacts

- **Industry push:** Explicit inclusion of generator contingencies
 - Improves representation of resources; enhances uncertainty modeling
- **This research:** Demonstrated the importance of performing a rigorous evaluation via duality theory
 - Provided insightful guidance in understanding market implications
 - Provided recommendations on necessary changes to ensure a fair and transparent market structure
 - Pave way for *different reformulations* to introduce corrective actions
- **Enabled a theoretical analysis of the anticipated changes**
 - Effect on market prices, settlements, and revenues
- **Primary impact of impending changes**
 - New congestion component within the traditional LMP; reflects impact of congestion in the post-generator contingency states

Future Research and Next Steps

- Evaluate the **impact of market reformulations on FTR markets**
 - Implications of corrective actions on **revenue adequacy** of FTR auctions
 - Investigate associated modifications to the **simultaneous feasibility test (SFT)** for FTR auctions
- **Relation to stochastic programs and market clearing in a stochastic environment**
- Investigate **more systematic and suitable ways** to determine **generator participation factors**
 - Based on inertia, synchronizing power coefficients, electrical distance (proximity) to the source of uncertainty
 - Advanced stochastic look-ahead scheduling models

Questions and Comments?



Together...Shaping the Future of Electricity